Existi ng literature has not yet defi ned a clear-cut relati onship between ownership structure and capital structure. This study aims to contribute to this controversial argument by examining the impact of internal (managerial) ownership and external ownership on fi nancing preferences using the case of non-fi nancial fi rms listed on Karachi stock exchange during the period of 2008-2012. Our results suggest that the external ownership has a signifi cant eff ect on capital structure in accordance with the presence of blockholders. In contrast, the internal ownership has a complicated eff ect; it shows signifi cant positi ve and negati ve relati onship to leverage at lower and certain higher proporti on of managerial shareholding respecti vely. Besides, the combined analyses suggest that the presence of blockholders negates the impact of managerial ownership on capital structure. This implies that the presence of large and dominant shareholders in Pakistani fi rms may have caused a bias for debt fi nancing to protect their voti ng power and returns.
I
The signifi cance of corporate ownership structure on capital structure choices has been long argued in the academic literature. The debate on separati on of control and ownership of corporati ons at least goes back to Adam Smith (1776) in reference to joint stock companies. The concept of current modern publicly held large corporati ons and the prescribed role of ownership and control in these corporati ons was put forward by Berle and Means (1932) . The separati on of ownership and control especially in large corporati ons refers to how the shareholders as owners (residual claimants) can monitor the hired managers who run the fi rm and manage its resources on behalf of the owners. Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their seminal work on the principal-agent problem, defi ned the agency costs that occurred in relati on to the separati on of ownership and control. They elaborated the mechanism of causing agency costs in light of the ownership claims held by insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors with no direct role in management of the fi rm), respecti vely.
Since Modigliani and Miller (hereaft er MM theorem,1958) , the literature has tended to focus on the role of taxes, informati on asymmetry, or imperfect markets as explanati on of capital structure decisions but not including the agency problems (Hart, 1995, p. 147) . Existi ng literature fails to shed enough light on Agency theory's role to understand the confl ict of interest between providers of fi nances and controllers of fi nances in its relati on to capital structure decisions. Hart (1993) argues that the agency approach has more advantage on other theories of capital structure, as it clearly explains why the fi rm issues senior debt (long term) and why a fi rm's failure to meet debt obligati ons leads to bankruptcy as a penalty. Jensen and Meckling (1976) defi ned the agency relati onship "as a contract under which one or more person (the principal) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegati ng some decision making authority to the agent". Moreover, they point out the managers and the stockholders' relati onship as a pure agency relati onship, in relati on to the separati on of ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308 ) defi ned agency cost as a sum of the following three: 1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, 2) the bonding expenditure by the agent,
3) the residual loss.
On the other hand, the discussion on capital structure has been theorized by MM theorem (1958) . The MM theorem assumes the perfect and fricti onless capital markets where the cost of raising equity or debt is irrelevant. Since the theorem was developed, eminent scholars have been extensively examining the real market where transacti on costs, monitoring costs, informati on problems such as moral hazard and adverse selecti on eff ects, and other related agency costs are embedded, by looking at the fi rm's capital structure and esti mati ng the associated agency costs as the deviati on from the MM theorem. They developed conditi onal theories, such as, Trade-off theory, Pecking order theory, Freecash fl ow theory and Market ti ming theory that can help the managers to achieve the opti mal mix of debt-equity under specifi c conditi ons by way of minimizing the agency costs. According to Jensen (1986) the opti mal mix of debtequity rati o is considered as the point at which the value of the fi rm is maximized where the marginal costs of debt corresponds to the marginal benefi ts.
Many empirical and theoreti cal studies have explored diff erent factors based on cross secti onal ti me series data to seek the fi rms' opti mal capital structure. For instance, the Trade-off theory emphasizes the tax advantage on debt. The Pecking order theory proposes the use of internal funds, debt and equity fi nancing respecti vely, while the Free cash fl ow theory also supports the leveraging even though it has the liquidity risk potenti ally resulti ng in fi nancial distress. However, scholars have not yet reached a clear consensus. According to Myers (2001) "there is no universal theory of debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one".
Most of the previous studies have been done to investi gate the relati onship between ownership structure and capital structure of the fi rms in developed economies (Berger, Ofek & Yermack, 1997; Firth, 1995; Friend & Lang, 1988; Grossman & Hart, 1982; Jensen, Solberg & Zorn, 1992; Kim & Sorenson, 1986) . These studies examine the relati on of debt either with managerial ownership or with large external shareholders except only a few studies such as Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (2002); Firth (1995) ; Short, Keasey and Duxbury (2002) which have investi gated the relati on of debt to managerial ownership and external shareholders. Most of the menti oned studies used the data of developed economies such as Australia, UK and US. This study aims to look at the Pakistani fi rms as the "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 1 Khan Shoaib, Suzuki Yasushi Ownership and capital structure of Pakistani non-nancial rms case of a developing economy, in order to contribute to the analysis of the relati onship between managerial/external ownership, parti cularly the interest alignment hypothesis, managerial entrenchment, large shareholders and the capital structure to seek for the universal applicability of the opti mal debt-equity mix. Since MM theorem (1958) , the literature has tended to focus on the various factors to explore the capital structure, but very few studies include the agency problems in the study of opti mal capital structure. The Agency theory has the power to explain the confl ict of interest between providers of fi nances and controllers of fi nances in its relati on to capital structure decisions (Hart, 1995, p.151) . Hart (1993) argues that, despite limited empirical evidence, the agency approach has more advantages than other theories of capital structure, as it clearly explains why the fi rm issues senior debt (long term) and why a fi rm's failure to meet debt obligati ons leads to bankruptcy as a penalty.
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First of all, we note great contributi ons by Jensen and Meckling (1976) analyzing the relati ons between owners (shareholders) and managers in the principalagent framework. They argue that the agency cost may vary in accordance with the shirking of acti viti es by the agent, pointi ng out the importance of close monitoring by the principal to prevent the agent's shirking. In order to minimize the interest confl icts, they propose equity ownership by managers (managerial ownership) to reduce the agency costs and potenti al shirking acti ons by aligning the agent's interest with the principal to share the residual.
How does the principal-agent relati on aff ect the capital structure in corporate fi nance? Hart (1995, p. 151) , states that "although the agency approach may not be the whole story, it would seem to be an essenti al part of any fully developed theory of capital structure". He further argues that a great deal of empirical work on capital structure theories have produced what he called "stylized fact". For stylized facts he refers to, highly profi table fi rms that have low debt, more tangible asset fi rms that have high debt, debt for equity-swaps which raise the share prices and so forth (Hart, 1995, p.141) . Despite the insuffi cient empirical evidence of agency approach in capital structure, Hart (1995) argues the strong potenti al of Agency theory to recognize the agency cost of debt and equity in capital structure choices.
In an agency framework apart from Agency theory, other studies propose diff erent assumpti ons to tackle the agency confl icts which arise due to the separati on of ownership and control. The classical work by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shliefer and Vishny (1986) proposes the "acti ve monitoring hypothesis" stati ng that external blockholders can reduce the managerial opportunism caused by the principal-agent relati on. Opportunisti c behavior of managers include consuming an excessive amount of perks, shirking of their responsibiliti es, and investi ng in negati ve net present value (NPV) projects that prioriti ze managers' personal benefi ts instead of shareholders or fi rms (Fosberg, 2004) . Moreover, Berger et al., (1997) study the relati onship between managerial entrenchment and fi rms' capital structure, and conclude that entrenched managers may not choose an opti mal capital structure. They defi ne entrenchment as "the extent to which managers fail to experience discipline from the full range of corporate governance and control mechanisms".
Informati on economics sheds light upon other agency costs arising due to informati on asymmetry, such as moral hazard and adverse selecti on eff ects (Akerlof, 1970; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Greenwald & Sti glitz, 1990; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Sti glitz (1985) insist that the concentrated ownership has enough private incenti ves to control the managers due to their adequate stake in the fi rm. To achieve the eff ecti ve control, there exist large expenditures for them to acquire suffi cient informati on for effi cient monitoring. By product, there may occur a free rider problem parti cularly when small shareholders get benefi ts from larger shareholders' eff orts. The principal-agent theory insists that if large external shareholders acti vely monitor management acti viti es, there will be litt le space for managers to choose a debt level that would maximize their own interest (Brailsford et al., 2002) . Acti ve large shareholders can use their voti ng power to exert control on managers and support more debt in order to keep their majority. Hence, the relati onship between concentrated ownership and fi nancial leverage is assumed to be positi ve. Table 1 summarizes the possible eff ects of external and internal (managerial) ownership patt erns on the choices of capital mix. In general, the principal-agent theory predicts a "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 1 Khan Shoaib, Suzuki Yasushi Ownership and capital structure of Pakistani non-nancial rms positi ve relati onship between concentrated ownership and debt, as well as a positi ve view on managerial shareholdings against managerial opportunism (Berger et al., 1997; Brailsford et al., 2002; Firth, 1995; Friend & Lang, 1988) .
There is no a priori causality to determine the relati onship between the concentrated/diff used ownership and the capital structure, nor is there a priori causality to determine the relati onship between the managerial ownership and the capital structure. In fact, empirical studies provide mixed fi ndings on the relati onship between managerial equity ownership and fi rm capital structure (Bathala, Moon & Rao, 1994; Berger et al., 1997; Brailsford et al., 2002; Firth, 1995; Friend & Lang, 1988; Ruan, Tian & Ma, 2011; Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Short et al., 2002; Wahba, 2014) .
Only a very few preceding studies by Brailsford et al., (2002) and Short et al., (2002) on Australian and UK fi rms respecti vely, directly explore the impact of large external shareholders and managerial equity ownership on fi rms' capital structure. Short et al., (2002) fi nd the negati ve relati onship between large shareholders and debt, pointi ng out the debt and large shareholders as substi tute disciplinary devices. The presence of large external shareholders negates the debt related creditors monitoring hypothesis which means that large shareholders as acti ve monitors doesn't support the debt as a monitoring tool. At the same ti me, they report the positi ve relati onship between managerial ownership and leverage, and state that "increased risk aversion on the part of management owners leads to a reducti on in riskshift ing behavior, and consequently a reducti on in the agency costs of debt and an increase in the agency costs of equity". Contrary to this, Brailsford et al., (2002) fi nd an inverted U shaped relati onship between managers' equity ownership and leverage, that is, up to a certain level it shows positi ve and at a higher level it shows a negati ve relati onship endorsing the interest alignment hypothesis. At the same ti me, they explore the positi ve relati onship between large shareholders and leverage, endorsing the acti ve monitoring hypothesis by shareholders.
To the best of our knowledge there is no preceding study that att empted to explore the eff ects of larger shareholders and managerial equity ownership on capital structure choices in the developing economies, except Ruan et al., (2011) and Wahba (2014) , but they explore the relati onship only between managerial equity ownership and debt of Egypti an and Chinese fi rms respecti vely. Both of these studies explore the signifi cant relati onship between ownership structure and capital structure. Ruan et al., (2011) , fi nds that when managerial ownership is less than 18% or more than 46% there is a negati ve relati on with leverage, and positi ve when managerial ownership ranges from18% to 46%, i.e. a non-monotonic relati onship. Similar to fi ndings of studies on developed economies, studies on developing economies also report mixed results and lack of consensus. As pointed out by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silane, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) , in general, the developing economies are more prone to agency confl icts due to weak insti tuti onal and legal frameworks and less developed capital markets. This is in However, the reducti on in managers' shirking would possibly reduce the borrowings (there is no a priori mechanism to explain the relati onship). Also, there is no clear-cut explanati on of how the leverage may lead to higher risk of bankruptcy.
II. There is no a priori mechanism to endorse that managerial shareholding may reduce or fuel "managerial opportunism". Also there is no clear-cut explanati on of how it encourages or discourages managers to prefer debt (leverage) or equity (to avoid the risk of bankruptcy).
Weak
III. Diff used ownership may encourage the minor shareholders to become "free-riders" on monitoring, resulti ng in increasing the agency cost. But, debt providers can play the role as monitors to reduce the managerial opportunism.
IV. Managers with less incenti ves under the diff used ownership structure may be involved in severe "shirking" to uti lize the corporate sources for their own perks and privileges. But, debt providers can play the role as monitors to reduce the managerial opportunism.
Source: Author's own compilati on "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 1 Khan Shoaib, Suzuki Yasushi Ownership and capital structure of Pakistani non-nancial rms line with the argument of Ruan et al., (2011) which states that "agency problems in the Chinese civilian-run listed companies are more severe due to the emerging market environment". Therefore, consistent with the menti oned argument this study tries to explore the impact of ownership structure patt erns on capital structure of nonfi nancial Pakistani fi rms. We hypothesize that although there is no a priori causality, given the special context of Pakistan, the concentrated external ownership seemingly having politi cal and economic power in contrast to the managerial equity ownership can be an eff ecti ve governance tool to reduce the agency problems, e.g. managerial opportunism, entrenchment. In other words, we may say that if the degree of managerial opportunism or entrenchment is high even in the presence of the concentrated ownership, the majority shareholders are less eff ecti ve monitors being less willing to bear extra monitoring cost. That is, they want to be free riders who have few incenti ves to be engaged in monitoring.
To accumulate empirical cases is, in our view, the only way to answer the puzzle on how internal and external shareholdings would infl uence the diff erent mix of fi nancing. In this study, we use the data of non-fi nancial listed fi rms on the Karachi Stock Exchange, Pakistan, as a typical case of a developing economy where the agency cost is considered extremely high, due mainly to the weak regulatory framework for investor protecti on under the underdeveloped capital market.
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This secti on deals with the investi gati on of an empirical relati onship between the ownership structure focusing on large external ownership as well as managerial equity ownership (internal ownership) and the fi rms' choices of capital structure of Pakistani non-fi nancial listed fi rms. Data and variables used in the study and the esti mati on method are explained below.
Data sample
This study investi gates non-fi nancial fi rms listed on Karachi stock exchange (KSE) to draw the empirical evidence between ownership and capital structure. We look at the data during the period of 2008-2012. Nonfi nancial fi rms are regulated by Securiti es and Exchange 
of Pakistani non-nancial rms
Commission of Pakistan (SECP), however, fi nancial fi rms are also regulated by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). On the basis of diff erent regulatory frameworks, fi nancial fi rms are excluded from this study. We fi nally look at the data set which includes 186 fi rms. Due to the availability of data some values are missing and our fi nal data set is unbalanced panel data from diff erent industrial sectors i.e. Cement, Texti le, Sugar, Engineering, Chemical, Fuel and Energy and so on during the above menti oned period.
Variables
In order to explore the empirical relati onship between ownership and capital structure variables, we used the similar empirical model used by Brailsford et al., (2002) and Short et al., (2002) . The variables used in this study are presented in Table II , with their basic computati on explanati on.
Speci cation of research model
This study employs the ordinary least square (OLS) regression's fi xed eff ect method for empirical esti mati on to esti mate the impact of explanatory variables i.e. ownership compositi on (MEO and LARGE) on dependent variable i.e. debt-equity rati o (DE) an indicator for capital structure. Stati sti cally capital structure (leverage) is a functi on of equity ownership by managers and larger external shareholders, in the light of our hypothesis i.e. capital structure is dependent on ownership compositi on.
Following the existi ng literature to control the fi rm specifi c characteristi cs that may infl uence the choices of capital structure, we used the fi ve control variables in our esti mati on model (Brailsford et al., 2002) . Size (SZ) is used as control for risk factors i.e. larger fi rms are assumed as less prone to bankruptcy risk (Agrawal & Nagarajan 1990; Friend & Lang, 1988) .
To address the issue of agency costs, control variables of growth (GROW) and free cash fl ow (FCF) are used. In the existi ng literature it is argued that fi rms' with future growth opportuniti es have more access to debt and we assume a positi ve relati onship with it. Free cash fl ow hypothesis suggests that issuance of debt can alleviate the free cash problems, however, there is another argument i.e. availability of free cash discourages the manager from issuing new debt. In this perspecti ve we assume a negati ve relati onship of free cash fl ow with debt. The Free cash fl ow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) , is discussed as more complex in literature. In order to control for the tax benefi ts on debt, we used Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) and (DPS) as control variables in our esti mati on. NDTS, argument by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) , proposed a negati ve relati onship of it with leverage. In our regression model we performed three esti mati ons to explore the impact of ownership on choices of capital structure of Pakistani non-fi nancial listed fi rms. Equati ons 1, 2 and 3, have been employed to empirically explore the impacts of explanatory variables i.e. larger external shareholders, internal managerial ownership and combined impact of internal and external ownership, respecti vely on dependent variable, i.e. debt-equity rati o a proxy for fi rm leverage.
(1)
O Empirical results
This secti on presents the empirical fi nding of the above regressions. These fi ndings are computed by using the fi xed eff ect regression model. The esti mati on shows the signifi cant relati onship among dependent, explanatory and control variables. Since the study uses the data of multi ple years, we use White's test (1980) to check the eff ect of potenti al heteroskedasti city in fi xed eff ect regression. Table 3 , presents the descripti ve stati sti cs of the study. The value of debt-equity rati o ranges from 0 to 1.76. External fi ve largest shareholders own 0.6% share at the minimum to 99.7% at the maximum in the sample fi rms. The average age of the sample fi rms is 15.16 years. Other control variables show positi ve minimum value except the free cash fl ow and growth variables. This table also shows that Pakistani fi rms on average paid 5.30 Pakistani Rupees, as a dividend per outstanding share. In order to check the correlati on among the variables used in the study, the pair-wise correlati on matrix has been constructed shown in Table 4 . This correlati on matrix explains the phenomenon of "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 1 Khan Shoaib, Suzuki Yasushi Ownership and capital structure of Pakistani non-nancial rms Source: Author's own based on analysis of data "e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 1 Khan Shoaib, Suzuki Yasushi Ownership and capital structure of Pakistani non-nancial rms multi -co-linearity. The values of cross correlati on in the matrix are fairly small, which indicates that the multico-linearity can be negligible among the variables used for the esti mati on. The regression results of equati on 1, 2, and 3 esti mati ons are presented in Tables 5, 6 , and 7, respecti vely. Table 5 presents the impact of large external shareholders on leverage, Table 6 shows the impact of internal ownership i.e. managerial equity ownership on fi rm's fi nancing choices and fi nally, Table 7 presents the fi rms' fi nancial structure in the presence of large external shareholders as well as managerial equity ownership.
D
The empirical result presented in Table 5 shows that the presence of large shareholders has signifi cant and positi ve relati onship with leverage. This indicates that large shareholders may preferably encourage the managers to use the leverage to increase their return on equity. It also contributes to introducing the managers' performance-based incenti ves and compensati ons. These factors and the debt related monitoring by creditors may have contributed to reducing the principal-agent confl icts as highlighted by Grossman and Hart (1982) . This relati onship also endorses the Sti glitz (1985) argument that larger shareholders with undiversifi ed portf olios need strict monitoring on managers to increase return on their investment. Undiversifi ed portf olio refers to the "e-Finanse" 2016, vol . 12 / nr 1 Khan Shoaib, Suzuki Yasushi Ownership and capital structure of Pakistani non-nancial rms phenomenon when someone owns a major proporti on of shares in a certain fi rm, and doesn't have investments in other fi rms i.e. (diversifi cati on). Portf olio diversifi cati on in fi nance literature is highlighted to cope with investment related risk or uncertainty. Therefore, larger shareholders with undiversifi ed portf olios have to perform strict monitoring in order to minimize the risk or uncertainty related to their investment.
The eff ecti ve regulatory and legal framework of ensuring fair and prompt disclosure in the capital market may discourage the decision makers in fi rms to rely heavily on debt. However, as La Porta et al., (1998) point out, in general, the developing economies are more prone to agency problems due mainly to the weak insti tuti onal, legal and regulatory framework. Under the alleged patronageclient network with the atmosphere of not letti ng any major listed fi rms go bust typically observed in developing countries, large shareholders with politi cal and economic power may insist on leverage to seek higher returns on equity while maintaining their majority in shareholding. The Free cash fl ow control hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) can also explain the positi ve relati onship. Under a close and eff ecti ve monitoring by the large shareholders, according to the hypothesis, the future obligati ons for interest payment and repayment of borrowed principal would minimize the availability of free cash under the managers' discreti on, which would ulti mately reduce the shirking among managers. As put by Jensen (1986) , that "debt creati on, without the retenti on of the proceeds of the issue, enables managers to eff ecti vely bond their promise to pay out future cash fl ow". They also state that it does not mean that debt issue will always have positi ve control eff ects. These results are in the line with fi ndings of Berger et al., (1997); Brailsford et al., (2002); Firth (1995); Friend and Lang (1988) . They all explore a positi ve relati onship between large external shareholders and debt.
The relati onship between dependent variable and managerial equity ownership as explanatory variable is presented in Table 6 . The results show a positi ve and signifi cant relati onship between them. This relati onship implies that the managers use leverage to seemingly seek for their returns in accordance with their own incenti ves. However, higher managerial ownership proporti on than a certain level shows a signifi cant and negati ve relati onship with leverage. These fi ndings show that the managers as major shareholders would come to avoid the use of debt. These fi nding are consistent with the results of Brailsford et al., (2002) and Ruan et al., (2011 ). Brailsford et al., (2002 , which states "When managerial share ownership reaches a certain point, there is potenti al for an increase in managerial opportunisti c behavior which is associated with a decrease in the debt rati o". Due to this opportunisti c behavior there is a possibility that managers may not support debt, partly because they would rather keep their discreti on in management to avoid the creditor's monitoring and control or gaining the agency related benefi ts of debt through their higher equity ownership. Based on these fi ndings it can be argued that higher managerial equity ownership to a certain extent encourages managerial opportunism and managerial entrenchment. These fi ndings endorse Jensen and Meckling (1976) interest alignment hypothesis of internal and external shareholders. These outcomes are basically consistent with the preceding empirical fi ndings such as, Berger et al., (1997) ; Brailsford et al., (2002) ; Kim and Sorensen (1986) ; Ruan et al., (2011) and Short et al., (2002) .
Finally we examine the combined eff ect of large external shareholders and managerial equity ownership on fi rms' choices of fi nancial structure. Our esti mati on of the correlati on is presented in Table 7 . These fi ndings endorse the assumpti on that large external shareholders who are able to eff ecti vely uti lize their voti ng power could infl uence the corporate strategic decisions including the corporate strategy for fi nancing. The existence of larger external shareholders show a signifi cant positi ve relati onship with leverage.
On the other hand, the relati onship of managerial equity ownership shows diff erent results, respecti vely either in the presence or absence of large external shareholders. The presence of large external shareholders negates the signifi cance of managerial ownership on leverage compared to its absence. This fi nding implies that the close monitoring by large external shareholders can signifi cantly aff ect the capital structure choices. With this strong control the shareholders may choose a certain debt level that may perhaps reduce the managerial opportunism and entrenchment.
Control variables in all of the three esti mati ons show the following relati onships. Size and free cash fl ow show negati ve and signifi cant relati onships with leverage. Growth and non-debt tax shield show signifi cant relati onship. Finally, dividend per share shows negati ve but insignifi cant relati onship.
"e-Finanse" 2016, vol. 12 / nr 1 Khan Shoaib, Suzuki Yasushi Ownership and capital structure of Pakistani non-nancial rms As a whole, our results show that ownership structure signifi cantly aff ects the capital structure of fi rms listed in Pakistan. Up to a certain level of managerial equity ownership the interest alignment hypothesis can be applied to contribute to reducing the principal-agent confl ict. Managerial equity ownership higher than from a certain proporti on with low debt rati o has potenti al to lead to managerial opportunism and entrenchment. This means managers with higher ownership and transfer of control from external minority shareholders with weak monitoring could uti lize the corporate sources for their own perquisites. Simultaneously, the presence of large shareholders seems to be decisive in listed fi rms to occasionally cancel out the role of managerial equity ownership. The strong control power by Pakistani large shareholders may contribute to reducing the principalagent confl icts such as managerial shirking, opportunism and entrenchment, though the leverage does not always lead to the fi rm's value enhancement in the long run.
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This study tries to investi gate the signifi cance of ownership structure on a fi rm's choice of debt or equity, i.e. capital structure. To empirically investi gate the relati onship, the study uses the data of non-fi nancial fi rms listed in Pakistan. By employing the concept of modern corporati on, the separati on of ownership and control, the study divides ownership structure into internal (managerial equity ownership) presumably having stronger incenti ves along with the ownership stake, and external ownership (large external shareholders/ blockholders) apparently as residual claimants with more voti ng power but delegati ng the role of management to managers. This structure is the core of Agency theory in terms of principal-agent relati onship.
Our fi ndings highlight the presence of agency confl icts, such as managerial opportunism, entrenchment, etc. in non-fi nancial fi rms in Pakistan. Empirical fi ndings prove that low level of managerial equity ownership helps in aligning the manager's and shareholder interests. However, higher level of managerial ownership does not. Moreover, the presence of acti ve large shareholders is more eff ecti ve to solve the agency confl icts between principal and agent. Our fi ndings also show that large external shareholders through acti ve monitoring and voti ng control rights can minimize the infl uence of managerial equity ownership in an agency's capital structure decisions.
In the case of Pakistan our fi ndings suggest that fi rms rely on more debt mainly as a tool of monitoring and parti ally to gain the tax benefi ts. Another reason to rely on debt could be the possibility of politi cal instability or uncertainty in the market that infl ates the cost of equity. Finally, the free cash fl ow hypothesis assumes a positi ve relati onship between free cash and debt, based on the argument that regular interest payment reduces the availability of free cash under a manager's discreti on and can prevent them from shirking. However, in the case of Pakistan free cash fl ow shows negati ve relati onship to leverage; these fi ndings again support the Pecking order theory of uti lizing internal fi nancial sources fi rstly, in order to reduce the cost of informati on, monitoring cost, etc.
In capital structure decisions, Agency theory framework recognized the fi nancial distress and bankruptcy as agency costs of debt. Therefore, in developed economies in order to avoid these costs, large external shareholders hesitate to rely on debt in the long run. However, in the case of Pakistan large shareholders are involved in acti ve monitoring and support debt in order to protect their interest and control which they may lose due to dispersed ownership. This phenomenon may exist on their assumpti on that with more voti ng and controlling power they can protect their interest.
